Setting boundaries
When the Asghar Khan case was first revived for hearing before the Supreme Court on February 29, many hailed it as the harbinger of a transformative moment in the history of civil-military relations in Pakistan. But very quickly, the case has become all about unsubstantiated claims, accusations and counter-accusations. While former army chief Aslam Beg says the revelations of the then head of Mehran bank, Younus Habib, are a bolt from the blue, ex-DG ISI Asad Durrani claims that his boss, Gen Beg, was fully on board and issued the initial orders to disburse 'donations' among politicians and also oversaw the entire operation of distribution of funds. Shedding light on the political role of the ISI, Gen Durrani repeated a widely accepted argument to make his point about the centrality of Gen Beg to the whole operation: while in theory, the ISI responds to multiple centres of power – the president, three service chiefs, chairman of the Joint Services Headquarters and the prime minister – in practice, the army chief wields more power over the ISI than any of its other "bosses."
But one claim that Generals Beg and Durrani have in common is that whatever they did, it was on the orders of then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and in the service of the 'national interest.' This raises a fundamental question, one that may get to the heart of many of Pakistan's problems, not least the civil-military imbalance: is it justified for an officer of the armed forces – or for a civilian politician for that matter – to follow a command even when it is blatantly unconstitutional and illegal? In the affairs of state, at what point should principles take precedence over the holy chain of command? Pakistan's history is littered with examples when army officers and civilian leaders have obeyed the illegal orders of superiors and set the country on the path of self-destruction. Thus, if one were to imagine the ideal verdict in the Asghar Khan case, it would be one that mandates punishment for those who willfully and knowingly act outside the ambit of the law and the constitution in the discharge of official duties. Red lines must be drawn, and this is the perfect opportunity to do it, given that we have the case of top officers who knowingly violated their oath of office and defiled the constitution. What must also be checked are the political workings of the ISI. The court has now ordered the government to submit the notification under which the ISI's political cell was set up by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975. For as the chief justice himself said on Thursday, while everyone recognises the ISI's sacrifices for, and services to, this country, it must not be allowed to use its capabilities against politicians. If clear lines are drawn, this will also save the institution itself from suffering the adverse ramifications of the illegal actions of top bosses and individual officers.
Saturday, May 19, 2012
When the Asghar Khan case was first revived for hearing before the Supreme Court on February 29, many hailed it as the harbinger of a transformative moment in the history of civil-military relations in Pakistan. But very quickly, the case has become all about unsubstantiated claims, accusations and counter-accusations. While former army chief Aslam Beg says the revelations of the then head of Mehran bank, Younus Habib, are a bolt from the blue, ex-DG ISI Asad Durrani claims that his boss, Gen Beg, was fully on board and issued the initial orders to disburse 'donations' among politicians and also oversaw the entire operation of distribution of funds. Shedding light on the political role of the ISI, Gen Durrani repeated a widely accepted argument to make his point about the centrality of Gen Beg to the whole operation: while in theory, the ISI responds to multiple centres of power – the president, three service chiefs, chairman of the Joint Services Headquarters and the prime minister – in practice, the army chief wields more power over the ISI than any of its other "bosses."
But one claim that Generals Beg and Durrani have in common is that whatever they did, it was on the orders of then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and in the service of the 'national interest.' This raises a fundamental question, one that may get to the heart of many of Pakistan's problems, not least the civil-military imbalance: is it justified for an officer of the armed forces – or for a civilian politician for that matter – to follow a command even when it is blatantly unconstitutional and illegal? In the affairs of state, at what point should principles take precedence over the holy chain of command? Pakistan's history is littered with examples when army officers and civilian leaders have obeyed the illegal orders of superiors and set the country on the path of self-destruction. Thus, if one were to imagine the ideal verdict in the Asghar Khan case, it would be one that mandates punishment for those who willfully and knowingly act outside the ambit of the law and the constitution in the discharge of official duties. Red lines must be drawn, and this is the perfect opportunity to do it, given that we have the case of top officers who knowingly violated their oath of office and defiled the constitution. What must also be checked are the political workings of the ISI. The court has now ordered the government to submit the notification under which the ISI's political cell was set up by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975. For as the chief justice himself said on Thursday, while everyone recognises the ISI's sacrifices for, and services to, this country, it must not be allowed to use its capabilities against politicians. If clear lines are drawn, this will also save the institution itself from suffering the adverse ramifications of the illegal actions of top bosses and individual officers.
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